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ABSTRACT. With the increasing number of adaptation plans being generated across the world at multiple scales and levels of
organization, the issue of coordination among plans is emerging as a significant challenge. We focus on how lack of coordination may
constrain their efficiency as a result of potential transfers of vulnerability. This paper focuses on interdependencies between autonomous
feedback control loops that represent adaptation processes and makes the link between autonomous action and (social-ecological)
system levels. These interdependencies allow changes in vulnerability of one adaptation actor as a consequence of the reduction of
vulnerability of another actor. We refer to the processes behind such changes as “vulnerability transfers” and suggest the need for their
identification so that actors may make agreements to address them explicitly. A thorough analysis of each step involved in a feedback
control loop enables the identification of potential interdependencies, leading to seven basic types of vulnerability transfer. The analysis
of example cases of observed transfers of vulnerability in three coastal case studies then demonstrate the suitability of feedback control
loop networks to assess, ex-ante, potential vulnerability transfers. The example cases feature all types of theoretically possible
vulnerability transfers. Initial empirical investigation showcases the relative importance of shared infrastructures in generating transfers
of vulnerability. It also helps to reveal forgotten links to avoid decreasing efficiency of adaptation processes beyond each autonomous
agent’s jurisdiction. Our representation contributes to a more comprehensive ex-ante identification of transfers and hence the possibility
to discuss and manage them.
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INTRODUCTION
With the consequences of global change expected to become
increasingly acute in the coming decades there has been a
proliferation of adaptation planning across organizational levels
and various organizational types (Adger et al. 2009a). Cities,
counties, regions, and sectors are generating plans with weak, if
any, coordination with other organizations (Oberlack 2017).
These plans often conflate with, or readdress, what was previously
known as development plans, and can distort development
objectives (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010). Meanwhile global
change processes open windows of opportunity for reforms or
complete reorganization (Folke et al. 2010) that may enhance
traditional development objectives (Bisaro and Hinkel 2016).
Lack of coordination, one of the main barriers to adaptation,
requires consistency between actions undertaken at autonomous
individual as well as collective levels.  
In this paper, we consider adaptation in the context of global
change. For the term “adaptation,” we include both development
and adaptation, because both mobilize for transformation
(Bousquet et al. 2016), and characterize processes of intentional
change of (individual, technological) practices (i) to respond to
alterations of the environment: ecological, climatic, social (Smit
and Pilifosova 2003) and (ii) to manage exposure and vulnerability
(Pielke 1998). There is a myriad of possible adaptation actions
(Adger et al. 2005), all of which may have potential consequences
beyond the jurisdiction of the entities where they are carried out
(Adger et al. 2009b, Challies et al. 2014) ranging from local
spillovers to global teleconnections. We suggest that these
unintended consequences of adaptation processes fall under the
umbrella of vulnerability transfer, a term we define further in the
following paragraph, because they may lead to a redistribution
of vulnerabilities (Atteridge and Remling 2018). A vulnerability
transfer is a consequence of an interdependency between
autonomous adaptation actors (individuals, organizations,
groups) implementing adaptation plans, either because the actors
have connected interests or are operating in a joint environment.
This situation is considered as a source of “maladaptation”
(Barnett and O'Neill 2010). This term is also used by the IPCC
to qualify situations of failure of adaptation[1]. For the sake of
clarity we stick to characterizing the processes rather than the
outcome. We need then tools for identifying potential processes
of vulnerability transfer, at least qualitatively. The overall
objective of this work is (1) to make explicit the links and
interdependencies between autonomous adaptation actors, and
(2) to provide support for discussions about vulnerability transfers
and delineate the limits of the system under consideration in order
to prevent tensions and inefficiencies at a larger scale. In doing
so, we connect the action-oriented and system-oriented
perspectives that are opposed in Eisenack and Stecker (2012):
action is considered at the autonomous agent level while the
system is considered via the scope of interdependencies.  
We outline a framework that may contribute to such vulnerability
assessments and test it with empirical observations. Here we
define vulnerability following Turner et al. (2003:8074):
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“Vulnerability is the degree to which a system, subsystem, or
system component is likely to experience harm due to exposure
to a hazard, either a perturbation or stress/stressor.” We define a
vulnerability transfer, then, as an increase in the vulnerability of
community y due to actions taken by community x to decrease
its own vulnerability, while Atteridge and Remling (2018) speak
of “redistribution” due to adaptation. However, vulnerability is
not necessarily conserved during transfers; the vulnerability of
community y after a transfer is not necessarily equal to its
vulnerability before transfer plus the change in vulnerability of
community x. Because relations of autonomous adaptation
actors to their environment are diverse, positive transfers may also
occur, and synergies should also be accounted for (Adger et al.
2009b). Several conceptual frameworks have already dealt with
the issue of side effects of policies or actions: externalities
(Dahlman 1979), nonmarket values (Bark 2011), virtual water
(Kumar and Singh 2005), off-site costs (Khan et al. 2008),
systemic risks (Centeno et al. 2015), ecological solidarity
(Mathevet et al. 2016), and telecoupling (Friis et al. 2016). These
frameworks are seeking to attribute the origin of a problem
through monitoring of flows and/or addressing global issues
because of interdependencies between rather large and loosely
defined systems.  
Our goal is to address the consequences of these
interdependencies from the range of adaptation actions that are
quickly emerging. Vulnerability may be transferred when one
autonomous adaptation actor changes conditions of another
while attempting to reduce her own vulnerability. We build on a
network of action situations involving these autonomous
adaptation actors to map potential interdependencies and
systemic feedbacks. Our aim is to uncover the mechanisms behind
them. These transfers may lead to an increase of instances of
injustice as well as inefficiencies at higher levels of organization.
To elicit these interdependencies and their pathways, we build a
generalizable list of possible transfers based on the mechanisms
through which they may occur. We draw on theory from feedback
systems to identify theoretical types and use case studies to
provide examples of their occurrence. Our approach should help
improve identification of interdependencies as highlighted by
Atteridge and Remling (2018) as well as the underlying
mechanisms, both on a theoretical and an empirical basis.  
After a brief  review of existing concepts used to characterize
transfers of vulnerability, we introduce a representation of
community adaptation through a network of regulatory feedback
control loops (Anderies 2015), and draw from it possible
mechanisms for transfers to occur. We then put the theoretically
elaborated list of possible mechanisms to a trial through case
studies in coastal areas in France, the United Kingdom, and South
Africa. These case studies enable us to reflect on the usefulness
of this typology of vulnerability transfers and draw out some
preliminary principles that this representation enables, including
some ideas for improving governance.
VULNERABILITY TRANSFERS AS AN EXTENSION OF
EXTERNALITIES AND SPILLOVERS
Here we take quick stock of existing frameworks and theories
that aim to describe spillovers resulting from actions of agents
that generate impacts beyond their jurisdiction, variably referred
to as externalities, environmental leakages, ancillary effects,
offsite costs or benefits, systemic risks, territorial ecology,
telecoupling, and CPR management problems. There is a huge
literature on these issues (~140K references with at least one of
these terms on google scholar, see Klein et al. 2014 for a review)
and there are several requests in the literature to integrate their
assessment into place-based ecosystem services assessment
(Pascual et al. 2017). Working with vulnerability transfers as a
common concept enables researchers and stakeholders to
formalize them with a common vocabulary. This paves the way
for an analysis in a common frame, a prerequisite for a solidarity
approach to collaborative governance (Mathevet et al. 2018a).
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, all the approaches
mentioned above are used ex-post. Identifying ex-ante
interdependencies that pave the way for potential vulnerability
transfers may help prevent failures from occurring. In the
diagnostic procedure suggested by Oberlack and colleagues
(2018) to operationalize telecoupled systems and polycentric
governance for integrated analysis, we focus mainly on two steps
(out of seven): identifying flows that link regions (or systems) and
establishing the network of linked action situations through which
they are instantiated (other steps are rather focusing on
institutional analysis and distant consequences).
Identification of “spillovers”
The notion of externalities from economics is at the root of
transfers of vulnerability seen as the consequences of the
adaptation process of one group on another groups’ adaptation
capacity, exposure, and sensitivity (Stringer et al. 2006, Osbahr
et al. 2010). At larger geographical scales, telecoupling addresses
how new policies in one place have consequences in distant places
(Friis et al. 2016). Most, if  not all, of these conceptual frameworks
are based on the existence of flows (information, material, energy)
from one place or one system to another.  
Most flows considered in this literature are spatial, either locally
for physical flows or, as in the telecoupling literature, over a longer
range for informational or financial flows. More recently, some
flows have been considered across social groups (Eakin et al. 2014)
or temporal scales. All these flows are enabled by
interdependencies between actors (Paavola and Adger 2005).  
Pushing the identification of flows further, territorial ecology
seeks to identify all flows generated or needed by a process, which
might be induced by a component of a land system (Loiseau et
al. 2013). These methods filter out transfers that cannot be
explained through a flow of something (e.g., material,
information, money) and typically lead to input-output matrix
analysis (Lutter et al. 2016).  
Finally, the literature also explores interdependencies that are not
based on flows. Among other framings, problems stated as
common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990, 2005) feature
interdependencies through the availability of a resource that is
dependent on actions of several autonomous decision makers.
All these types of interdependencies may drive vulnerability
transfers when one decision maker involved in an interaction
makes a change whose impacts reach another decision maker. In
such cases, interdependencies feature a network of adjacent action
situations (McGinnis 2011, McGinnis and Ostrom 2014) through
which vulnerabilities can be transferred.
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Establishing and handling a network of action situations
Managing these interdependencies to prevent the emergence of
tensions between various actors and actor groups has been the
focus of integrated resource management for at least 30 years.
Many integrated approaches assume, as in stewardship
approaches and ethics, a benevolent social planner, i.e., a steward
of the future, that is able to allocate resources optimally for all
needs while taking into account interactions between coupled
systems (Mathevet et al. 2018a). It could be a government body
(Osberghaus et al. 2010), a legitimate regulator (Eisenack 2016),
or a mix of public action and collective action in the management
of natural resources (Mathevet et al. 2018b). However such
integration is difficult for four reasons: (1) special interests and
power struggles, (2) lack of suitable arenas to manage interactions
between systems, (3) persistence of inconsistencies when
boundaries are drawn to make an object manageable, and (4)
situations in which it is not possible to collect further information
to deal with uncertainties at particular scales. Solutions based on
coordination across scales seem to be more promising (Daniell
and Barreteau 2014, Guerrin et al. 2014) and often fit propositions
that characterize polycentric governance (Ostrom 1999).  
In this paper, we aim to disaggregate the analysis of adaptation
processes at the level of autonomous entities in order to identify
the suitable governance levels to be included in the analysis
(Paavola and Adger 2005). These autonomous entities are able to
act in order to target a goal, monitor success in reaching this goal,
and possibly revise action patterns accordingly in pursuit of this
goal. Following ideas from complexity science that recognize the
absence of a global controller in any economic system (Arthur et
al. 1997), as well as the observation of inefficacy of centralized
decisions that would ignore the autonomy of adaptive agents
(Nagendra and Ostrom 2012), we assume that there is an
irreducible plurality of autonomous decision centers with their
own goals that drive their own adaptation processes. A “contested
social political process” (Eriksen et al. 2015:524) is emerging from
the interactions among these adaptation processes. Oberlack and
Eisenack (2018) describe cases with an observed lack of
coordination leading to constraints to some actors’ adaptation
capacity. Hereafter, we elaborate a conceptual generic model to
support the qualification of these social political processes
intertwined with physical flows.
A GENERIC MODEL OF VULNERABILITY TRANSFER
Vulnerability transfers are driven by interdependencies. We thus
first consider the network of adaptation actors as they are
connected through various interdependencies, then we describe
the dynamics of each autonomous adaptation actor. As we aim
to develop tools for the ex-ante identification of potential
vulnerability transfers, our strategy is to elaborate theoretical
types of interdependencies to serve as guidelines when assessing
adaptation plans. The core focus of our approach to studying
vulnerability transfer is the identification of a list of theoretically
possible interdependencies between adaptation processes, which
might enable transfers of vulnerability.
Social-ecological systems (SES) as networks of regulatory
feedback control loops
Here we build on Anderies (2015) to represent an SES as a network
of feedback control loops (FBCL). We consider that each agent
(autonomous adaptation actor) endorses a specific set of separate
and possibly competing goals. In each agent-goal pair, the goal
component drives a set of actions, i.e., asset allocation, performed
by the agent through a set of infrastructures that transform these
actions into goods and services. Goals are characterized by a
domain of interest, a governance level, a reference area, a spatial
scale, and a typical time scale.  
The elementary feedback loop shown in Figure 1 is generated by
an agent, whether an individual, group, or organization within a
given SES, and driven by a particular goal she is attempting to
manage. All agents typically generate several independent FBCLs,
unless they are able to formalize a composite goal. It may also be
the case that an agent who is a member of an organization may
act independently and generate an FBCL while the organization
generates another FBCL at the same time. Beside the goals, a
FBCL features an asset allocation process conditioned by
decision infrastructures, including institutional arrangements,
knowledge systems, and value systems, a “plant” (a set of
infrastructures that translates asset allocation actions into
outcomes), and monitoring capacity. That is, the agent considers
the infrastructures at her disposal and decides to use them to
generate the expected outputs fitting her goal according to the
resources allocated. Although infrastructures considered as
components of the plant may evolve, they typically will not change
radically at the FBCL time scale.
Fig. 1. Representation of a component of a social-ecological
system (SES) as an elementary feedback control loop (FBCL),
adapted from Anderies 2015. Note “C” in the circle to the left
represents “comparison” of the goal to the actual measured
outcome. In feedback control, “C” is often simply the difference
between the goal measure and output measure.
This basic representation of FBCLs can tackle multiple time
scales by featuring actions that are not only allocations of assets
for production of immediate flows (on the fast time scale) but
also investment in infrastructures that will impact flows in future
time steps (on the slow time scale) competing for limited resources
in the present. This trade-off  between investment and
consumption is well known but does not fit well with the standard
representation of a FBCL where the structure of the “plant” (or
the set of infrastructures mobilized in the production process) is
assumed static.  
We amended Anderies’s original formulation by adding and
specifying disturbances and elements of knowledge (representation
[2], information, etc.) sourced out of the loop, as well as the
creation of unintended by-products. Disturbances, or
uncertainties (Anderies 2015), are represented by signals
exogenous to the FBCL that may impact and distort signals
endogenous to FBCL. Disturbances may affect outcomes of asset
allocation decisions that enter the plant, outcomes from the plant,
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Fig. 2. Possible interactions between one feedback control loop (FBCL) of an agent x and another
FBCL of an agent y. x=y is allowed but xi≠yj.
or monitoring outcomes that provide input to the controller (and
subsequently measured and compared with the target, see Fig. 1).
We assume agents’ decisions are made based on two sources of
information: (1) internal sources such as the comparison between
goal and measurement to assess its level of achievement, and (2)
external sources such as information on possible processes that
may be employed and potential needs including risk assessment.
Finally, this information may be impacted by uncertainties within
the decision making unit associated with limited understanding,
imperfect institutional arrangements, or biases associated with
value systems such as in Anderies et al. (2019).  
We now turn our attention to using networks of FBCLs as a
potential method to identify interdependencies and the transfers
of vulnerability they enable across a “network of adjacent action
situations” (McGinnis 2011). In a similar vein, Kimmich (2013)
formalized the representation of linked adjacent action situations
and uncovered the underlying action situation network in the
empirical example of rural electricity provision in India. The links
between action situations were realized through the impact of the
outcomes of a game in one action situation on payoffs (or other
components) in another game in another action situation. In our
case, each action situation is a FBCL operating in a dynamically
varying environment rather than in a situation with fixed payoffs
leading to equilibria in a game in a focal action situation. We
hence extend the description of action situations as dynamic
entities in order to identify vulnerabilities to exogenous drivers
induced by interdependencies.
Defining and analyzing vulnerability transfers
Beyond flows of material or information, the outputs from
FBCLs have the potential to become disturbances for other loops.
Assets and infrastructures involved in FBCLs might also be
shared. Figure 2 shows a minimal network of FBCLs with two
nodes and the theoretically possible interdependencies. All
elements shown in dashed lines are intended to convey possible
transfers as detailed in Table 1.  
Possible transfers are then of two major types: elements 1–4
depending on flows inducing disturbances (positive or negative)
and elements 5–7 depending on sharing scarce resources or shared
infrastructures. The first category is mainly related to by-products
generated by one FBCL that may be exchanged with another. The
second category is related to shared infrastructures and resources,
with issues such as competition or mutual investment.  
Based on the typology of possible vulnerability transfers listed in
Table 1, we now determine whether each type can be found in real
case studies. The classification in Table 1 is meant to serve as a
guide in the analysis of real case studies to identify significant
transfers. Within an SES featuring explicit adaptation processes,
the first step is to identify the agents involved and their goals. For
each association of agent and goal, the second step involves
describing its adaptation process as a FBCL:  
1. External pieces of information, including risk assessment,
that determine an agent’s set of actions; 
2. Assets an agent can mobilize to progress toward her goal; 
3. Infrastructures involved in the process and key uncertainties
regarding their function and potential exogenous shocks; 
4. Outputs, goods, and services, as well as by-products
generated; 
5. Process output measures used to assess whether the current
pattern of action is suitable. 
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The third step consists of identifying FBCLs that might affect
other FBCLs through one or more of the types of transfer listed
in Table 1.
Table 1. Types of vulnerability transfer mechanisms. Legend:
1. Goal to comparison circle: information about a goal, i.e.,
numbers specifying allowable levels of extraction, desired levels
of well being, etc., quality of an infrastructure, etc.
2. Comparison circle: information about the difference between
measured quantities (information flows out of a sensing device,
including a human) and goal. This “error” signal enters the
decision box.
3. Asset allocation to infrastructures: actions affecting
infrastructure: construct, extract, change, destroy, etc.
Exiting infrastructures: state of the system (information that can
be gathered by a sensor), which is fed back into the system (see
point 2). Other entering arrows represent disturbances. FBCL,
feedback control loop.
 
T­
ype
Vulnerability transfer mechanism Meaning
1 Impact on available information
(internal model of agent)
FBCL x modifies information
taken in account by Agent y
2 Impact on realized asset
allocation
Assets that Agent y intended to
allocate are modified because of
FBCL x
3 Impact on realized outcomes The outcome of processing assets
allocated by Agent y is perturbed
by FBCL x
4 Impact on measurement The monitoring set up by agent y
is not what she assumes because
of FBCL x
5 Interference between agents
allocation decisions
Availability of assets for both
FBCLs is connected
6 Approximation of significant
shared plant dynamics by agents
Both FBCLs refer to at least one
common infrastructure
7 Modification of the availability
of main plant dynamics for
Agent x through its allocation to
other processes by Agent y
An infrastructure mobilized,
hence potentially transformed, in
FBCL y is an asset that might be
used in FBCL x
As a demonstration of feasibility, we selected a few FBCLs for
which there is evidence of a case of vulnerability transfer.
Subjectivity of the analysis is handled through the use of empirical
narratives produced by a field analyst (one of the coauthors of
the paper) and interpreted in a minimal network of FBCLs by
another member of the research team (first author) through a
diagram as in Figure 2. The generated representation is assessed
by the author of the narrative, and jointly revised if  necessary.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE TYPES OF
VULNERABILITY TRANSFERS
We analyzed multiscale adaptation processes to global changes
across three coastal case studies: Garden Route in South Africa,
Cornwall in the UK, and Languedoc in France. Extensive
fieldwork with semidirected interviews and public documentation
analysis was conducted in these case studies. More information
is available in reports and field based papers (Brown et al. 2017,
Guerbois et al. 2019, Naylor et al. 2019, Therville et al. 2019). We
use this set of case studies to identify example cases of each
theoretical type of transfer of vulnerability. We select here five
such example cases in order to demonstrate the diversity of
existing transfers.
Asset valuation in prioritizing protection policies in the UK: bias
toward large settlements
Our first example illustrates a vulnerability transfer between
FBCLs featuring goals with different governance levels and
reference areas. In this example case, government vulnerability to
policy hazard is transferred to municipality vulnerability to
hydro-meteorological hazards. Vulnerability to hydro-meteorological
hazards is also transferred between municipalities.  
Because flood protection policies are expensive, local
communities typically need subsidies. In Cornwall, municipalities
expect contributions from the national government in addition
to their own match funding. However, the national government
and the Environment Agency only have limited funds so must
decide what to protect. The issue is then trade-offs made by the
national government in allocating these limited funds. The
national government has developed a partnership-funding
calculator that incorporates various values into assessments of
viabilities of flood schemes, including relative deprivation of areas
with the aim of ensuring distributional fairness of flood
protection investment. These choices require explicit justification
provided by the financial valuation of assets protected. The
evaluation process is conducted through a formula designed at
the national level in the UK and filled in by the Environment
Agency and local government (Cornwall Council) to justify the
development of flood protection schemes. The outcome of these
evaluation processes depends on capacity of local government to
provide a value largely based on current land uses. In addition to
difficulties in assessing and accounting for aesthetic and cultural
values, this pattern is inherently biased against small and inland
rural municipalities because low population density means that
the number of properties within such communities is not large
and they are also likely to be relatively cheaper than in-demand
coastal view properties. In addition, it places limited value on
agricultural land and buildings relative to residential properties.
Hence governmental trade-offs can be largely determined by real
estate market dynamics.  
This issue involves two independent FBCLs, as illustrated in
Figure 3. Even though both government levels are concerned with
citizen protection, the national government enforces a strategy of
protecting national assets targeting the highest value through
accounting methods, while local councils are more concerned with
the viability of towns and local culture. In the first FBCL, the
national government considers its own representation of current
dominant risks for each region and the values at stake. They assess
the highest values that require protection in order to allocate
money and expertise according to their asset valuation protocol
in the light of existing infrastructures such as structural
protections, e.g., dikes. The government assesses its choices
according to estimated social and economic costs and benefits
(with significant reference to collective value of house prices). In
the second FBCL, regional municipalities have their
representation of the dominant risks to people and asset values
at stake. They can apply for funding from the central government
for flood and coastal erosion infrastructure, and are in charge of
works for local flood risk on small watercourses. These two
FBCLs are connected in three ways:  
1. Type 2. Through funding contributions from the national
government agency to selected municipalities (#1)[3]. 
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Fig. 3. Vulnerability transfers observed in the UK’s flood protection policies.
2. Type 6. Both FBCLs refer to common infrastructures:
municipalities may benefit from supra-scale flood
protection assets or a well-established label of interest
leading to additional subsidies (#2). 
3. Type 1. Municipalities’ choices are modifying the range of
estimated values in partnership funding accounting process
(#3). 
Municipalities transfer vulnerability to hydro-climatical hazards
among themselves, as framed by government control and its own
vulnerability to policy hazards. The transfer of vulnerability is
down and out from central government to regional and rural
government and communities. In this example the unintended
consequence of a flood risk management processes is the
generation of a bias against small sized settlements and
communities with financially low value buildings, e.g., rural
settlements.
Breaching the mouth of the Wilderness Lakes Estuary in the
Garden Route, South Africa
This example illustrates a vulnerability transfer between FBCLs
featuring goals with different time scales. It transfers residents’
vulnerability to flooding to South African National Parks
(SANParks) vulnerability to ecological degradation, through
municipality vulnerability to decrease in political support.  
The Wilderness Lakes area is a section of the Garden Route
National Park, with portions proclaimed as Ramsar site in 1991.
These wetlands, managed by SANParks, a government body
dedicated to nature conservation nation-wide, are also very
attractive for the leisure activities they offer, drawing large
numbers of tourists and wealthy second home-owners. Global
changes manifest there in increased severity of drought, flood
storms, fire events, increasing human population, needs for
development, and eroding ecological infrastructures (Guerbois et
al. 2019). These provide the context for multiple adaptations.  
The development of the flood plains and edges of the rivers and
lakes as a result of the attractiveness of the estuaries and the need
to increase municipality incomes has increased exposure to
flooding. As part of the Garden Route National Park, flood risk
in these estuaries have been managed by a nation-wide
organization dedicated to nature conservation, the South African
National Parks (SANParks). SANParks intervenes on the
dredging of the estuaries through the breaching of the river
mouths when predetermined water levels based on biophysical
studies are reached. However, using their political power,
influential residents along the edge of the estuaries lobbied
through municipalities for the mouths to be breached earlier.
Breaching the mouth too early accelerates the siltation process in
the long run by decreasing the river capacity to naturally flush
and move. Hence, by preventing natural flushing facilitated by
high water volume in those estuaries, this adaptation has increased
flood risk in the long term, while also impacting the integrity and
the functionality of these unique ecosystems.  
This issue involves three agents characterized by three FBCLs as
illustrated in Figure 4. The mandate of the conservation
organization SANParks is to ensure coastal ecosystem
conservation by allowing natural processes of silting and flushing
to take place, without compromising private and public
infrastructures along the edge of the rivers. SANParks allocates
money and labor to act on the river mouth according to a
scientifically established river-mouth management protocol. The
scenic beauty of the estuaries constitutes important assets for the
municipalities for generating revenues through ratepayers and
exploitation taxes. In the meantime, municipalities have the
mandate to manage flood risk. Riverside residents and other users
care for the short-term protection of their safety and assets. Their
flood risk assessment is subjective and influenced by the
information accessible to them. They can use their political capital
when they consider their exposure to be too high and request the
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Fig. 4. Vulnerability transfers observed in estuary breaching in South Africa.
dredging of the river mouth. When successful they get a feeling
of safety in the short term. The municipality is seen here as a
public infrastructure provider, tied up with social and economic
mandates. They mobilize their financial capacities, lobbying in
social networks, and equipment to provide public services that
contribute to the livelihoods of residents. These FBCLs interact
in three ways:  
1. Type 1. The riverside residents can influence municipalities’
estimate of political and economic risk (#1). 
2. Type 3. Municipalities’ choices modify the conservation
outcomes of SANParks regarding estuary dynamics
through derogation to the river mouth management
protocol (#2). 
3. Type 6. Sharing natural (#3a - the river mouth) and human
(#3b - social networks) infrastructures provides some means
of control for riverside residents. 
Shared infrastructures (ecological infrastructures and social
infrastructure) are here providing a pathway for one agent to
control the interdependence characterizing the bargain between
vulnerability of SANParks to ecological degradation and
vulnerability of riverside residents to flooding, with an immediate
reduction of vulnerability of municipalities to political risks.
Beach maintenance in the Languedoc region in France
This example illustrates vulnerability transfers between FBCLs
featuring goals with different domains of interest. It transfers
county vulnerability to decrease of beach supply to Conservatoire
du Littoral (French national coastal conservation agency)
vulnerability to coastal erosion.  
One of the very topical issues faced in the Languedoc region in
France is coastal erosion. It is high on the political agenda at the
regional level and is supported by economic stakeholders for
recreational activities and mass beach tourism, but also by
environmental stakeholders for biodiversity conservation values.
Indeed coastal erosion is wiping out beaches, which is neither
good for tourism (and hence regional economy) nor for sand dune
ecosystems and associated wetlands. In order to support the
tourism industry, local authorities direct significant financial
resources to counter erosion through adding sand taken from the
seabed or from accretion areas, and setting rock traps.  
Two FBCL are involved as illustrated in Figure 5: the county
authorities whose objective is beach maintenance, and the
Conservatoire du Littoral whose objective is dune ecosystem
conservation. According to both its assessment of beach area
needed and capacity to act and the monitoring of beach size, the
county allocates financial assets, labor, and sand resources to
replenish the beach and/or build rock traps. Besides maintaining
beach size, this practice raises uncertainties regarding degradation
of marine bed ecosystems as well as disturbance of natural sand
circulation. The Conservatoire du Littoral uses knowledge about
dune ecosystem dynamics to add infrastructures that regulate
human access, e.g., fences, wooden pathways, new access, and land
use rules, etc., onto the natural infrastructure of existing dunes.
The level of dune ecosystem health generated by these
accessibility management infrastructures depends on actual
storm events. These two FBCLs interact mainly in three ways:  
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Fig. 5. Vulnerability transfers observed in beach maintenance in France.
1. Type 3. Beach recharge adds sand and hence protects the
dunes from erosive forces from the sea, potentially reinforcing
the outcome of Conservatoire du Littoral actions in the short
run (#1). 
2. Type 4. Access regulation infrastructures restrict beach area
open for tourists, hence reducing the county’s accessible
“beach size” monitoring indicator (#2). 
3. Type 1. Sand mining degrades seabed ecosystems reducing
Conservatoire du Littoral’s capacity to cope with its
overarching value on ecosystem conservation (#3). 
These three interactions transfer current county vulnerability, i.e.,
decrease of revenues from beach tourism, to the future
vulnerability of Conservatoire du Littoral, i.e., seabed ecosystems
degradation. This example illustrates a long-term maladaptation:
adding sand to the beach reduces the perception of beach erosion,
and thus long-term adaptive capacity of users, and relies on a finite
resource whose extraction threatens another ecosystem, i.e., from
the sand dune ecosystem to the sea bed ecosystem.
Solar energy development in South Africa
This example illustrates a vulnerability transfer between FBCLs
featuring goals with different governance levels. In this case,
vulnerability to energy shortages is transferred from wealthy
residents to local government.  
In South Africa, the government is facing the crucial challenge of
providing electricity to all. Eskom, a national electricity public
utility, is implementing frequent load shedding all over the country
because of lack of production capacity. This calls for investments
in energy infrastructure, which may generate an increase in prices
for those who are already connected to local power grids in a
context of high revenue inequality. Local governments are
concerned that many people, mostly among the wealthy, invest in
solar panels and become autonomous, off-the-grid. These
disconnections decrease the ability of the government to expand
the existing energy grid and provide electricity to all.  
As shown in Figure 6, this example features two FBCLs. Local
government drives the first loop with a goal of providing
electricity to all, managing electricity as a public infrastructure
system. Wealthy residents drive the second loop with a goal of
securing access to electricity at a reasonable and foreseeable price.
The local government takes into account the ratio of households
connected to the grid as a feedback on their goal achievement.
This feedback, together with their representation of future
demand for electricity is used to decide on the allocation of their
dedicated financial resources to expand the electricity grid. At the
same time, wealthy residents decide on the basis of their electricity
bill, perceived quality of service, and with their representation of
reliability and costs of alternative sources to allocate their
financial resources to either individual solar panels or fee payment
for using the grid. These FBCLs interact in three ways:  
1. Type 2. Increasing the means for grid maintenance and
extension (#1). 
2. Type 5. Splitting financial resources between that dedicated
to individuals’ energy budgets and connection to a common
electricity grid (#2). 
3. Type 6. Encouraging wealthy residents to disconnect from
the local grid (#3). 
This example concerns the consequence of lack of reliable and
equitable energy provision public service. It features the loss of
potential for robustness transfer due to the disappearance of
interdependencies between agents’ FBCLs: wealthy residents’
robustness to economic downturn used to be transferred to local
government robustness to peak of electricity demand, which is
not any longer the case.
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Fig. 6. Vulnerability transfers observed in solar energy development in South Africa.
Mosquito control versus biodiversity conservation in the
Languedoc Region in France
This example illustrates a vulnerability transfer between FBCLs
featuring goals with different reference areas and time scales. It
transfers local planning authority vulnerability to mosquito
nuisance to conservation agency vulnerability to loss of
biodiversity.  
Another issue specific to the French case study is related to
mosquito control and its consequences on biodiversity. With
climate change and increasing international exchange of goods,
new species of mosquitoes have appeared in southern France.
They are active in cities and are increasing the sensitivity of urban
populations to potential vectors of serious disease and the general
nuisance of biting insects.  
Mosquitoes have always been present in regional coastal wetlands,
managed in some places to suit tourism, and left in other places
in order to maintain ecological processes, i.e., especially to
conserve insect-eating migratory birds, or indirectly to discourage
tourism-focused development. Economic interests pushing for
increased tourism and sensitivity of urban populations to
mosquitoes are putting this issue back on the political agenda.
The discovery of new low impact bioinsecticide, e.g., the Bacillus
thuringiensis israelensis or Bti) to control mosquitoes has also led
to reconsideration of the issue leading local planning authorities
to take a tougher stance on mosquito nuisance reduction.  
Two FBCLs are active, as illustrated in Figure 7. Local planning
authorities aim to reduce the mosquito nuisance while the Coastal
Conservation Agency and environmental NGOs (represented
together in Figure 7) care for biodiversity conservation. The local
planning authorities estimate impacts of available molecules and
the risk of mosquito spread in association with the perceived
nuisance of mosquitoes. Local planning authorities use financial
capacity and their political power to set rules regarding land uses
and to activate human-made infrastructure such as a “Bti
spreading platform.” They take part in the management of a
natural infrastructure, the lagoons, and associated wetlands, in
order to regulate the mosquito population and increase the quality
of tourists’ and urban inhabitants’ experience. On the other hand,
the Coastal Conservation Agency and environmental NGOs (and
scientists) focus on the extent of the impacts of this biopesticide
on wetlands and its fauna, especially by monitoring bird
populations. They allocate their funding capacity, social capital,
and conservation tools with the intention to control the ecological
state of wetlands with land use and water management rules. They
try to influence the state representative regarding authorization
of specific pesticide spreading. These FBCLs interact in three
ways:  
1. Type 2. The dispersion of Bti into the trophic chain impacts
the efficiency of allocation of conservation tools through
the natural infrastructure (#1). 
2. Type 6. Both FBCLs share an infrastructure, the lagoon and
associated wetlands. The way they use it modifies its state
and regulation (#2). 
3. Type 7. Rules related to access and use of wetlands are part
of the infrastructure landscape of action in the second
FBCL while they are part of the assets activated by the local
planning authority in their effort to regulate mosquito
nuisance. Their modification by the Coastal Conservation
Agency change local planning authorities’ capacity to act
(#3). 
Vulnerability of local planning authority to mosquito threat in
the short term is decreased at the expense of an increase of
vulnerability of Conservatoire du Littoral to a rarefaction of
some bird and other insect populations in the long term. The
relative power of both institutions is setting the balance between
both vulnerabilities. This example questions the prevailing
viewpoint about “adaptation to what and for whom” when
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Fig. 7. Vulnerability transfers observed in mosquito control in France. Bti, Bacillus thuringiensis
israelensis.
multiple agents share an infrastructure: expanding the use of Bti
seems an adequate adaptation to a greater mosquito nuisance by
local planning authorities but generates unintended impacts on
biodiversity through food web interactions in wetlands (Poulin et
al. 2010).
DISCUSSION
The insights from example cases in the previous section illustrates
the capacity of the network of the FBCL framework to help
characterize transfers of vulnerability. In this section, we build
on these empirical examples and discuss the capacity of the
network of the FBCL framework to encompass the existing
concepts described above. We discuss the relative frequencies of
various types of mechanism we identified in the empirical example
cases. We then return to the potential added value of the
framework and, finally, explore some consequences from a
political ecology perspective.
Usefulness of network of FBCL framework for exploring
interdependency effects
The network of the FBCL framework integrates previously
developed concepts to deal with various interdependencies
including spillovers and CPRs. It provides a compact
representation suitable to describe vulnerability transfers. It is
made up of seven types of transfer identified first through a
theoretical analysis. It provides a description of the mechanisms
enabling transfers while previous conceptual frameworks largely
focus on qualifying the consequences of transfers. Although
previous studies have revealed the damages caused by actions of
one agent that impact another ex-post, this formalism paves the
way for ex-ante structured discussions about potential transfers,
which is still to be tested.  
The five example cases above feature all seven types of interactions
listed in Table 1. This demonstrates that all the theoretically
possible mechanisms for vulnerability transfer can be observed in
practice. Our case studies in South Africa, the UK, and France
feature nine more examples of interactions in addition to the five
we selected for this paper. With the same method based on
interview and validation between one analyst and one case study
leader, we identified and described a total of 14 example cases of
vulnerability transfers among the three case studies. They are not
representative, but we consider they may already enable the
identification of some trends:  
1. Infrastructure sharing occurs in most example cases (10/14),
while other links are less frequent; 
2. Interdependencies due to generated flows (8/14), which are
also well analyzed in the literature, come second to
infrastructure sharing. 
3. The competition for resources that is the focus of the
extensive literature on commons is not the main
interdependency involved in vulnerability transfer (only
2/14); 
The benefit of the network of the FBCLs approach is that it
provides a systematic way for clarifying interdependencies and
possible vulnerability transfers between adaptation actors. It is
based upon the identification of the generated flows as well as
intersections between asset allocation decision making and/or
significant infrastructures. The transfers we can describe as flows
(types 1, 2, 3, and 4) affect exposure and sensitivity, while those
we can describe as due to shared resources (type 5) or
infrastructures (type 6) relate largely to adaptive capacity.  
With its strong focus on the systemic nature of SES, this
framework could lead, in theory, to an exhaustive identification
of potential vulnerability transfers provided that the work of
describing networks of FBCLs is exhaustive in the investigated
SES. This last condition is obviously not an easy one. First,
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application to an entire SES would be cumbersome because of
the potentially very large number of FBCLs. It is the analyst’s
responsibility to identify the crucial ones: those that involve the
main dynamics, the most sensitive goals, as well as those that
involve the weakest agents. Second, weak agents, those who might
suffer from transfers, tend to go unnoticed. There is still a need
for a capacity to give these weak agents voice in suitable policy
arenas to identify the FBCLs they are involved in. Highlighting
how weak agents are connected in FBCLs is one approach to help
prevent default silent acceptance of vulnerability transfers.  
Identification of main potential vulnerability transfers may help
practitioners together with scholars to delineate who should be
part of a collective action arena meant to coordinate adaptation
actions and improve their efficiency at system level. We consider
extension of network of FBCLs as a proxy to identify a pathway
to handle interdependencies in adaptation patterns.  
The FBCL metaphor is extremely general and applicable at all
scales. However, it is important that we are careful about how we
think of “control.” When we think of feedback loops in terms of
management and control, this assumes, in theory, that there is
some sort of rational planning actor consciously controlling the
system. However, in practice, decision makers are restricted by
limited knowledge, limited information, and limited legitimacy
and ability to act on the system. Moreover, feedbacks can emerge
without conscious, forward-looking planning. Myopic actors
make decisions without full knowledge of the structure of the
system that can lead to the emergence of FBCL where “control”
is partial and limited. Given that large infrastructure systems
require planned adaptation in the face of limited information and
ability to act, it is all the more important to incorporate
vulnerability transfers into the planning process because of it is
a source of uncertainties. Rational planning hence may call for
collaboration and communication across local FBCL systems.
Sharing infrastructures
Qualitative FBCL network analysis of three case studies has
highlighted infrastructure sharing as a key co-occurring
interdependence, while most other approaches are restricted to
flows and sequential interdependencies (Kimmich 2013). Based
on the case studies presented here, the existence of significant
sharing of infrastructures seems the most common
interdependency through which vulnerability transfers are
conveyed. Agents consider many infrastructures they mobilize as
part of their decision-making context even though they do not
contribute to their maintenance or preservation. For example, the
pathways used by South African women to access their fishing
grounds are part of a long lasting trail network that is currently
managed according to the interests of the tourism industry. Any
change in access to these pathways may change the capacity of
fishing women to transform their effort into food.  
Shared infrastructures connect FBCLs in various ways. We have
found three types of interdependency to be of particular
importance:  
1. Agents involved in two linked FBCLs intend to use the same
infrastructure for different purposes and, as a result, operate
it in different ways, as with multifunctional infrastructures.
Dams are classical examples, where choices must be made
involving trade-offs between flood control, water supply,
energy production, and recreational activities (Duflo and
Pande 2007, Brown et al. 2009, McNally et al. 2009). They
destabilize agreements between actors (Siciliano et al. 2015),
highlighting the need to manage links between FBCLs. 
2. Operation of an infrastructure by an agent x modifies its
quality and reduces its suitability and/or value to other users
without any intention or even perception of degradation by
x. In the mosquito example case, degradation of wetlands
due to the use of Bti is not meaningful to local planning
authorities, and hence not properly monitored. 
3. Weak agents X, i.e., having few resources, benefit from an
infrastructure maintained by others Y without generating
any loss in the service provided by it. It is still rational for Y 
to maintain. This transfer of robustness is de facto a tacit
social compromise. However when maintenance of this
infrastructure is no longer needed for Y or is threatening
their robustness, it may be stopped and the service provided
to X disappears, which is endangered by changes due to
decisions made outside the scope of this compromise. Free
riders X will suffer from an unplanned shift in the strategy
of the first agent Y in maintaining the shared infrastructure.
This can lead to a major shock to the livelihoods of the free
riders X. The transfer of vulnerability in this case is due to
the absence of a formal agreement on joint interests in shared
infrastructure, similarly to public good provision problems
in the case of investment or maintenance of shared
infrastructure (Ostrom et al. 1993).
Clarifying missing links
Our framework also provides a means to analyze missing links.
Empowering weak agents starts with identifying infrastructures
they consider meaningful as part of their own processes. Drawing
the diagrams enables one to identify links that could be added to
generate win/win transfers and generate solidarity. In the French
case study, another example case features interdependencies
between two FBCLs concerned with flood issues. It highlights
that for residents, public places and professional buildings are
meaningful infrastructures to achieve their goal of seeking
security, while the municipality is rather focusing on land use
zoning and individual mitigation plans. Without an actual link
between both FBCLs, the municipality is paying no attention to
residents’ key infrastructures.  
Hence, although it is possible with our framework to account for
various conceptualizations of spillovers and externalities, it also
facilitates explicit, systematic study of how vulnerabilities can
cascade across a system because of unintended consequences of
governance regimes. Our identification of seven types of
vulnerability transfer mechanism as a complete and relevant
typology provides for an ex-ante capacity to identify and negotiate
how the costs (impacts) of vulnerabilities are borne across space,
time, and social groups. Given the possibility of vulnerability
transfers we have outlined, the current situation with the
proliferation of uncoordinated adaptation plans mentioned in the
introduction could be a significant problem. Our analysis suggests
that a thorough analysis of potential transfers provided by
adaptation plans under construction may bring relevant links to
the fore, and could be used to prepare for the more effective
negotiation of agreements to promote coordination between
connected FBCLs.
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Consequences of autonomous loops
Political ecology considers adaptation as a social process (Basset
and Fogelman 2013). It is consistent with our framework because
it fits an aggregated view of what is emerging from interactions
among multiple autonomous adapting FBCLs. Adaptation could
hence lead to the exertion of authority (Eriksen et al. 2015), either
through controlling other agents’ FBCLs or imposing its own
FBCLs regardless of the consequences for others. Interdependencies
among FBCLs show that power relation analysis could be
conducted with the identification of intersections between FBCLs
and resulting in possible win-win solutions or double binding
situations.  
The issue now is to deal with these vulnerability transfers in order
to prevent local adaptations from generating maladaptations that
may worsen or weaken the economic and security situation of
some agents. A first attempt could involve the integration of
FBCL analysis with the identification or emergence of a supra-
agent that would provide the best adaptation pattern for all agents.
This is a tentative solution, relying on governmental institutions,
to prevent coordination difficulties in local public goods
management due to individual rent maximizing behaviors
(Osberghaus et al. 2010). However, total system optimization is
a very difficult task, if  ever feasible, and could lead to apparent
consensus, i.e., as a consultation process without collective
decision (Lascoumes and Le Gallès 2005). As Osberghaus and
colleagues (2010) propose, a polycentric approach might help.
From a policy making point of view, FBCL analysis enables us
to move beyond the issue of choosing a unique (complex) social
goal and finding the elusive set of controls to achieve it. Instead,
it provides means for the identification of interdependencies that
require coordination from a polycentric view perspective. This
identification points out then where effort toward negotiation
support should be delivered. Dialogue based on FBCL analysis
might hence help to circumvent barriers to adaptation due to
collective action obstacles as those pointed out by Oberlack and
Eisenack (2018).  
Hence, we conclude that a critical need is to provide suitable
arenas for this coordination and negotiation to occur. This goes
in the same direction as the conclusions by Alexander et al. (2015)
regarding the need for comanagement: social network analysis
could enhance comanagement by coupling FBCLs more strongly.
Preidentifying possible vulnerability transfers facilitates the
implementation of institutional solutions to environmental
problems, because it anchors adaptation actors and their
interdependencies in their context, as recommended by Paavola
and Adger (2005).
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Our empirical investigation shows that all theoretically possible
links between FBCLs generated by autonomous adaptation
agents in a common SES may be observed. Representation of
vulnerability transfers through a network of distributed
interdependent FBCLs enabled us to predetermine types of
interdependencies among adaptation actors that could lead to
vulnerability transfers. We could spot occurrences of each type
in case studies. Further study of empirical examples is needed to
identify potential correlations between types of transfer and
distance between FBCLs.  
The approach we developed entails identifying ex-ante all flows
of vulnerability, including invisible or nonmaterial ones. Pre-
existing concepts meant to capture ex-post interdependencies
focus on consequential interdependencies, missing, for example,
shared infrastructures. Our work emphasizes the need to track
pathways caused by potential flows of vulnerability, and provides
some preliminary tools for doing so.  
The existence of interdependence does not mean there is an actual
vulnerability transfer; nor does it mean that it should necessarily
be prevented. Rather, after identifying possible interdependencies,
we need to strive to understand the scope of possible transfers
this interdependence may convey. We observe that transfers
mostly shift vulnerability from one agent to another. Hence, it is
difficult to conduct an integrated quantitative analysis of change
of a general vulnerability. However, in most example cases a
decrease of vulnerability for one agent generates an increase of
vulnerability for another. This is due to the inefficiency of
distributed loci for adaptation decisions. Conversely, we also
observe, less frequently, transfers with an overall decrease of
vulnerability: difference of goals can lead to a more efficient
distribution of exposure or a reinforcement of adaptive capacity
when possibilities of transfer are identified, e.g., Conservatoire
du Littoral and county authorities at beach level with sand
recharge. These potential opportunities also need an arena in
which to gather concerned agents to build on these win-win
situations. In any event, discussion with stakeholders of types of
transfers and their expected consequences is required. SES level
participatory approaches could structure these discussions, and
enable the joint exploration of the potential for ecological
solidarity (Mathevet et al. 2018a) at SES scale.  
__________  
[1] https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/wg2TARannexB.
pdf
[2] All across this paper “representation” accounts for the way
people view their environment.
[3] For each case example described here, (#i) refers to a link in
the current figure marked with the same “i” in a circle, with i
belonging to {1;2;3;3a;3b}.
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